Rethinking Norm Psychology.

Norms permeate human life. Most of people's activities can be characterized by rules about what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden-rules that are crucial in making people hyper-cooperative animals. In this article, I examine the current cognitive-evolutionary account of "norm psychology" and propose an alternative that is better supported by evidence and better placed to promote interdisciplinary dialogue. The incumbent theory focuses on rules and claims that humans genetically inherit cognitive and motivational mechanisms specialized for processing these rules. The cultural-evolutionary alternative defines normativity in relation to behavior-compliance, enforcement, and commentary-and suggests that it depends on implicit and explicit processes. The implicit processes are genetically inherited and domain-general; rather than being specialized for normativity, they do many jobs in many species. The explicit processes are culturally inherited and domain-specific; they are constructed from mentalizing and reasoning by social interaction in childhood. The cultural-evolutionary, or "cognitive gadget," perspective suggests that people alive today-parents, educators, elders, politicians, lawyers-have more responsibility for sustaining normativity than the nativist view implies. People's actions not only shape and transmit the rules, but they also create in each new generation mental processes that can grasp the rules and put them into action.

Social Expectations are Primarily Rooted in Reciprocity: An Investigation of Fairness, Cooperation, and Trustworthiness.

Social expectations guide people's evaluations of others' behaviors, but the origins of these expectations remain unclear. It is traditionally thought that people's expectations depend on their past observations of others' behavior, and people harshly judge atypical behavior. Here, we considered that social expectations are also influenced by a drive for reciprocity, and people evaluate others' actions by reflecting on their own decisions. To compare these views, we performed four studies. Study 1 used an Ultimatum Game task where participants alternated Responder and Proposer roles. Modeling participants' expectations suggested they evaluated the fairness of received offers via comparisons to their own offers. Study 2 replicated these findings and showed that observing selfish behavior (lowball offers) only promoted acceptance of selfishness if observers started acting selfishly themselves. Study 3 generalized the findings, demonstrating that they also arise in the Public Goods Game, emerge cross-culturally, and apply to antisocial punishment whereby selfish players punish generosity. Finally, Study 4 introduced the Trust Game and showed that participants trusted players who reciprocated their behavior, even if it was selfish, as much as they trusted generous players. Overall, this research shows that social expectations and evaluations are rooted in drives for reciprocity. This carries theoretical implications, speaking to a parallel in the mechanisms driving both decision-making and social evaluations, along with practical importance for understanding and promoting cooperation.

Desperation and inequality increase stealing: evidence from experimental microsocieties.

People facing material deprivation are more likely to turn to acquisitive crime. It is not clear why it makes sense for them to do so, given that apprehension and punishment may make their situation even worse. Recent theory suggests that people should be more willing to steal if they are on the wrong side of a 'desperation threshold'; that is, a level of resources critical to wellbeing. Below such a threshold, people should pursue any risky behaviour that offers the possibility of a short route back above, and should be insensitive to the severity of possible punishments, since they have little left to lose. We developed a multi-round, multi-player economic game with a desperation threshold and the possibility of theft as well as cooperation. Across four experiments with 1000 UK and US adults, we showed that falling short of a desperation threshold increased stealing from other players, even when the payoff from stealing was negative on average. Within the microsocieties created in the game, the presence of more players with below-threshold resources produced low trust, driven by the experience of being stolen from. Contrary to predictions, our participants appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the severity of punishment for being caught trying to steal. Our results show, in an experimental microcosm, that some members of society falling short of a threshold of material desperation can have powerful social consequences.

Maladaptive personality traits as predictors of prosocial and trusting behavior in two economic games.

BACKGROUND: Dimensional models of personality disorders postulate interpersonal dysfunction as the core feature of personality pathology, and describe maladaptive personality traits that characterize the specific pattern of dysfunction that is experienced. Herein, we examined whether maladaptive traits predict prosocial and trusting behavior, both of which are highly relevant behaviors for interpersonal functioning. Specifically, we examined antagonism as a predictor of prosocial behavior in a dictator game, and suspiciousness as a predictor of trust in the faith game. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The study was preregistered and conducted online. The preregistration protocol is available at https://osf.io/er43j . Data and code are available at https://osf.io/2rvbg/ . Participants (N = 445) completed the German version of the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 to measure antagonism and suspiciousness. Additionally, they played the dictator game (more money taken away from another person indicates less prosocial behavior) and the faith game (choosing the sure choice instead of the faith choice indicates less trust). We conducted a linear regression model to test whether antagonism is associated with prosocial behavior in the dictator game and a logistic regression model to test whether suspiciousness predicts selection of the sure choice in the faith game. RESULTS: As hypothesized, higher levels of antagonism were associated with less prosocial behavior in the dictator game. The remaining hypotheses were not supported, as suspiciousness was not significantly associated with the likelihood of choosing the sure choice in the faith game. Exploratory analyses on participants' estimates of the sure choice amount suggest successful experimental manipulation in the faith game. CONCLUSIONS: The results on antagonism and prosocial behavior are consistent with those of previous studies that used categorial classification systems of personality disorders or examined non-pathological personality traits. Potential explanations for the non-significant effects of suspiciousness are discussed, including the small size and range of the sure choice payoff and that the anonymity of the game may have precluded suspicious traits from expressing. Future research with higher stakes and known interaction partners is needed to further probe the effects of suspiciousness.

Does stress make us more-or less-prosocial? A systematic review and meta-analysis of the effects of acute stress on prosocial behaviours using economic games.

Prosocial behaviour is fundamental for our social togetherness. Yet, how acute stress, a common everyday occurrence, influences our behaviours towards one another is still unclear. In this systematic review and meta-analysis, we aimed to quantitatively investigate the effect of experimentally induced acute stress on prosocial behaviours in economic games. We also probed possible moderators to explain differences in findings. We included 23 studies, 77 individual effects, and 2197 participants in the meta-analysis and found no overall differences between stress and control groups in prosocial behaviours (SMD=-0.06), or costly punishment (SMD=-0.11). There were no moderating effects of stressor type, participants' gender/sex, or the delay from the stressor to the task. However, the potential recipient of the donated money (person vs. charity) and the complexity of the decision did reveal some differences under stress. The results of this meta-analysis suggest that there is currently no clear answer to the question of whether or not stress increases or decreases prosociality. We highlight important open questions and suggest where the field should go next.

Variability in repeated economic games: comparing trust game decisions to other social trust measures.

Economic games are well-established tools that offer a convenient approach to study social behaviour. Although widely used, recent evidence suggests that decisions made in the context of standard economic games are less predictive of real-world behaviour than previously assumed self-reported questionnaires. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that economic games decisions in the laboratory are more likely to be influenced by the current situation, while questionnaires are specifically designed to measure people's average behaviour across a long period of time. To test this hypothesis, we performed a longitudinal study where 275 respondents played 16 Trust games every two days within a three-week period, and filled out a questionnaire that measures social trust. This study confirmed the instability of our measure of trust behaviour over time and the substantial stability of questionnaire responses. However, we found a significant association between self-reported social trust and participants' average behaviour in the trust game measured across sessions, but also with participants' behaviour measured only in Session 1. Nevertheless, analysis of behavioural changes in the Trust games over time revealed different behavioural profiles, highlighting how economic games and questionnaires can complement each other in the study of social trust.

Animacy and the prediction of behaviour.

To survive, all animals need to predict what other agents are going to do next. We review neural mechanisms involved in the steps required for this ability. The first step is to determine whether an object is an agent, and if so, how sophisticated it is. This involves brain regions carrying representations of animate agents. The movements of the agent can then be anticipated in the short term based solely on physical constraints. In the longer term, taking into account the agent's goals and intentions is useful. Observing goal directed behaviour activates the neural action observation network, and predicting future goal directed behaviour is helped by the observer's own action generating mechanisms. Intentions are critically important in determining actions when interacting with other agents, as several intentions can lie behind an action. Here, interpretation is helped by prior beliefs about the agent and the brain's mentalising system is engaged. Biologically-constrained computational models of action recognition exist, but equivalent models for understanding intentional agents remain to be developed.

Motor Coordination and Strategic Cooperation in Joint Action.

Naturalistic joint action between two agents typically requires both motor coordination and strategic cooperation. However, these two fundamental processes have systematically been studied independently. We presented 50 dyads of adult participants with a novel collaborative task that combined different levels of motor noise with different levels of strategic noise, to determine whether the sense of agency (the experience of control over an action) reflects the interplay between these low-level (motor) and high-level (strategic) dimensions. We also examined how dominance in motor control could influence prosocial behaviors. We found that self-agency was particularly dependent on motor cues, whereas joint agency was particularly dependent on strategic cues. We suggest that the prime importance of strategic cues to joint agency reflects the co-representation of coagents' interests during the task. Furthermore, we observed a reduction in prosocial strategies in agents who exerted dominant motor control over joint action, showing that the strategic dimension of human interactions is also susceptible to the influence of low-level motor characteristics.

Integrating web applications into popular survey platforms for online experiments.

Research using custom-made web applications is burgeoning as scholars increasingly conduct their experiments online. We show how researchers can integrate their web applications into popular survey software such as Qualtrics in five simple steps and provide the full JavaScript code and screenshots. This procedure allows participants to seamlessly switch from Qualtrics to their web applications without leaving the survey platform. This integration has two benefits: (1) it eliminates the risk that participants inadvertently drop out of the survey while switching from the survey software to the web application and vice versa; and (2) it saves researchers the fees charged by survey companies to host an external link on the survey platform. Hence, we make it easier to conduct research on targeted (e.g., national) samples using web applications.

The smell of cooperativeness: Do human body odours advertise cooperative behaviours?

Several physical features influence the perception of how cooperative a potential partner is. While previous work focused on face and voice, it remains unknown whether body odours influence judgements of cooperativeness and if odour-based judgements are accurate. Here, we first collected axillary odours of cooperative and uncooperative male donors through a public good game and used them as olfactory stimuli in a series of tasks examining whether and how they influence cooperative decision-making in an incentivized economic game and ratings of cooperativeness. Our results show that having access to the donor's body odours provided a strategic advantage to women during economic decisions (but not to men): with age, women were more likely to cooperate with cooperative men and to avoid interacting with uncooperative men. Ratings of cooperativeness were nonetheless unrelated to the donors' actual cooperativeness. Finally, while men with masculine and intense body odours were judged less cooperative, we found no evidence that donors' actual cooperativeness was associated with less masculine or less intense body odour. Overall, our findings suggest that, as faces and voices, body odours influence perceived cooperativeness and might be used accurately and in a non-aware manner as olfactory cues of cooperativeness, at least by women.

Improving the measurement of prosociality through aggregation of game behavior.

Prior research has found that people's choices in economic games are often only modestly related to their prosocial personality traits and to mundane prosocial behaviors. The present article reviews the recent literature showing that the strength of these relationships depends on the level of aggregation. Specifically, we demonstrate an increase in behavioral consistency after horizontal aggregation (across multiple game types), vertical aggregation (across multiple game variants), and a combination thereof. Moreover, we show that aggregation increases the magnitude of the relationships of game behavior with prosocial personality and mundane prosocial behavior. These findings illustrate that economic games can genuinely capture a core facet of human prosociality - but that their capacity for doing so is greater when multiple game behaviors are considered.

DieTryin: An R package for data collection, automated data entry, and post-processing of network-structured economic games, social networks, and other roster-based dyadic data.

Researchers studying social networks and inter-personal sentiments in bounded or small-scale communities face a trade-off between the use of roster-based and free-recall/name-generator-based survey tools. Roster-based methods scale poorly with sample size, and can more easily lead to respondent fatigue; however, they generally yield higher quality data that are less susceptible to recall bias and that require less post-processing. Name-generator-based methods, in contrast, scale well with sample size and are less likely to lead to respondent fatigue. However, they may be more sensitive to recall bias, and they entail a large amount of highly error-prone post-processing after data collection in order to link elicited names to unique identifiers. Here, we introduce an R package, DieTryin, that allows for roster-based dyadic data to be collected and entered as rapidly as name-generator-based data; DieTryin can be used to run network-structured economic games, as well as collect and process standard social network data and round-robin Likert-scale peer ratings. DieTryin automates photograph standardization, survey tool compilation, and data entry. We present a complete methodological workflow using DieTryin to teach end-users its full functionality.

Leveraging economic games to integrate and differentiate personality and psychopathology.

A comprehensive model that integrates, yet differentiates, between personality and psychopathology is needed. Emerging empirical models of psychopathology are aligned structurally with trait models of personality, suggesting clear points of convergence. However, traits, themselves, are not sufficient to quantify consequential adaptivity and maladaptivity. Rather, as multiple theoretical accounts argue, unsuccessful pursuit of goals and needs, and the inability to flexibly adapt goals to fit the situation, is how maladaptivity is understood to emerge. Thus far, though, the empirical literature has suffered from an unsatisfactory connection between structural (or trait-based personality) models and our understanding of dysfunctional processes (psychopathology). Economic games, which elicit intensive repeated behavior suitable for studying dynamic processes, have been leveraged to explore how personality and pathology are associated with behavior across a variety of tasks. When coupled with computational modeling, economic games offer a promising method for integrating and differentiating personality and psychopathology. Ultimately, a fully formed model of psychopathology will be achieved when structural models of personality and psychopathology can be merged with a better understanding of the underlying functional processes of each. This will likely only be achieved by leveraging a number of available tools across disciplines.

Are social desirability scales desirable? A meta-analytic test of the validity of social desirability scales in the context of prosocial behavior.

Social desirability (SD) scales have been used for decades in psychology and beyond. These scales are sought to measure individuals' tendencies to present themselves overly positive in self-reports, thus allowing to control for SD biases. However, research increasingly questions the validity of SD scales, proposing that SD scales measure substantive trait characteristics rather than response bias. To provide a large-scale empirical test of the validity of SD scales, we conducted a meta-analysis (k = 41; N = 8980) on the relation between SD scale scores and prosocial behavior in economic games (where acting in a prosocial manner is highly socially desirable). If SD scales measure what they are supposed to (namely, SD bias), they should be negatively linked to prosocial behavior; if SD scales measure socially desirable traits, they should be positively linked to prosocial behavior. Unlike both possibilities, the meta-analytic correlation between SD scores and prosocial behavior was close to zero, suggesting that SD scales neither clearly measure bias nor substantive traits. This conclusion was also supported by moderation analyses considering differences in the implementation of games and the SD scales used. The results further question the validity of SD scales with the implication that scholars and practitioners should refrain from using them.

Rational Dictators in the Dictator Game Are Seen as Cold and Agentic but Not Intelligent.

In Dictator Games, dictators decide how much of a given endowment to send to receivers with no further interactions. We explored the social inferences people draw about dictators from the dictators' money amount sent and vice versa in 11 experiments (N = 1,425): Participants rated "unfair" dictators, who sent little or no money, as more agentic, but less communal than "fair" dictators, who sent half of the endowment. Conversely, participants expected more agentic and conservative but less communal dictators to send less money than less agentic, more liberal, or more communal dictators. Participants also rated unfair dictators as less intelligent but expected less intelligent dictators to send more money. When participants played the Dictator Game with real money, only self-reported communion predicted the money amount sent. Thus, participants' inferences might not reflect reality, but rational social actors should not only fear to appear unfair but also unintelligent.

Reducing the Cost of Being the Boss: Authentic Leadership Suppresses the Effect of Role Stereotype Conflict on Antisocial Behaviors in Leaders and Entrepreneurs.

What drives entrepreneurs to engage in antisocial economic behaviors? Without dismissing entrepreneurs' agency in their decision-making processes, our study aims to answer this question by proposing that antisocial economic behaviors are a dysfunctional coping mechanism to reduce the psychological tension that entrepreneurs face in their day-to-day activities. Further, given the overlap between the male gender role stereotype and both leader and entrepreneur role stereotypes, this psychological tension should be stronger in female entrepreneurs (or any person who identifies with the female gender role). We argue that besides the well-established female gender role - leader role incongruence, female entrepreneurs also suffer a female gender role - entrepreneur role incongruence. Thus, we predicted that men (or those identifying with the male gender role) or entrepreneurs (regardless of their gender identity) that embrace these roles stereotypes to an extreme, are more likely to engage in antisocial economic behaviors. In this context, the term antisocial economic behaviors refers to cheating or trying to harm competitors' businesses. Finally, we predicted that embracing an authentic leadership style might mitigate this effect. We tested our predictions in two laboratory studies (Phase 1 and 2). For Phase 1 we recruited a sample of French Business school students (N = 82). For Phase 2 we recruited a sample of Costa Rican male and female entrepreneurs, using male and female managers as reference groups (N = 64). Our results show that authentic leadership reduced the likelihood of entrepreneurs and men of engaging in antisocial economic behaviors such as trying to harm one's competition or seeking an unfair advantage.

Conjecturing Harmful Intent and Preemptive Strike in Paranoia.

Paranoia depicts a belief of others having harmful intent. Research using economic games has exhibited the correlation between paranoia and the propensity to characterize ambiguous intentions as harmful. Using a non-clinical sample recruited online from the United States (N=290), we examined whether paranoid thoughts influence aggressive behavior against the subjective perception of harmful intent. We conducted a preemptive strike game wherein aggressive behavior was assumed to be guided by the fear of an opponent. The outcomes indicate that (1) individuals with high paranoia assume harmful intent of an opponent more than those with low paranoia (2) conjecturing an opponent's harmful intent predicted an increase in the probability of a preemptive strike, and (3) paranoia did not have a statistically significant effect on encouraging a preemptive strike. Additionally, the exploratory analysis revealed that paranoia was related to participant's aggressiveness and with suppositions of other's self-interests and competitiveness. This study presents empirical evidence that paranoia is related to the perception of social threats in an uncertain situation. We discuss the possibility that paranoid ideation can promote or inhibit a preemptive strike.

Childhood environmental adversity is not linked to lower levels of cooperative behaviour in economic games.

Cooperation is a universal phenomenon, it is present in all human cultures from hunter-gatherers to industrialised societies, and it constitutes a fundamental aspect of social relationships. There is, however, variability in the amount of resources people invest in cooperative activities. Recent findings indicate that this variability may be partly explained as a contextually appropriate response to environmental conditions. Specifically, adverse environments seem to be associated with less cooperation and recent findings suggest that this effect is partly mediated by differences in individuals' life-history strategy. In this paper, we set out to replicate and extend these findings by measuring actual cooperative behaviour in three economic games - a Dictator game, a Trust game and a Public Goods game - on a nationally representative sample of 612 people. Although we found that the cooperation and life-history strategy latent variables were adequately captured by the models, the hypothesised relationship between childhood environmental adversity and adult cooperation and the mediation effect by life-history strategy were not found.

Domineering Dispositions and Hierarchy Preferences: Differentiating the Impact of Traits and Social Values in Economic Games.

In this article, we examined the relation between valuing hierarchies (dominant value orientations) and personally wanting to get ahead, without regard for others' welfare (domineering dispositions). Survey data from five studies (total N > 1,500) indicated differences between being domineering and endorsing dominant value orientations. This distinction was also evident in different strategies in economic games. Domineering individuals typically gave less to a powerless player (dictator game) but changed behaviors when the other party possessed bargaining power (ultimatum game). Individuals endorsing dominant value orientations did not show such "exploitative opportunism." In a third-party punishment task, in contrast, individuals with dominant value orientations were more likely to intervene against fair decisions (i.e., upholding inequalities between others). Correcting behaviors of others were not predicted by domineering dispositions. We discuss implications for distinguishing between traits and social values more broadly.